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COMITY OF ERRORS: WHEN FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IGNORE STATE LAW DECRIMINALIZING
SENTENCES
Hon. James A. Shapiro∗

INTRODUCTION
Many states have criminal sentences that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter, “the Guidelines”) refer to as
“diversionary dispositions.”1 Diversionary dispositions are sentences
that generally do not count as convictions under state law.2 But federal
∗ Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois; Adjunct Professor, Federal Courts, John
Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois; Member, Federal Defender Panel, Northern District of
Illinois, 2003-07; Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, 1989-95; Hearing
Board Chair, Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, Chicago, Illinois, 1998-2007;
President, Decalogue Society of Lawyers, 2007-08; Master of the Bench, Chicago-Lincoln Inn of
Court, 2003-present; J.D. 1985, William and Mary School of Law, Williamsburg, Virginia; A.B.
1981, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut. The author wishes to dedicate this article to Illinois
Supreme Court Justice Charles E. Freeman, who respects the separate sovereignties of state and
federal law, and comity between state and federal courts. The author also wishes to dedicate this
article to his children, Kevin and Allison Shapiro, in hopes that they pursue some form of
scholarship in their careers, whether law-related or not.
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (2007). Section 4A1.2(f) provides:
Diversionary Dispositions
Diversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution)
is not counted. A diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt,
or a plea of nolo contendere, in a judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence under §
4A1.1(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered, except that diversion from juvenile
court is not counted.
Id. (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(d) (West 2007) (“A defendant's plea of guilty
pursuant to this chapter [relating to drug offenses] shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose
unless a judgment of guilty is entered, pursuant to Sec. 1000.3.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.35(6)
(West 2007) (considering juvenile adjudication as non-conviction, and juvenile not deemed to have
been found guilty or criminal by such adjudication); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f) (West
2007) (explaining Illinois’s diversionary disposition of “supervision shall be deemed without
adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or
disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime. Two years after the discharge and dismissal
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law, particularly the Guidelines, treats diversionary sentences the same
as convictions,3 contrary to state statutory language.4 For example, the
under this Section, unless the disposition of supervision was for a violation of [certain specified
offenses, which require a longer waiting period], a person may have his record of arrest sealed or
expunged as may be provided by law.”) (emphasis added); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2A-1 (2007)
(explaining Utah’s diversionary “‘[p]lea in abeyance’ means an order by a court, upon motion of the
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but
not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement”)
(emphasis added); W. VA. CODE § 60A4-407 (1992) (“Whenever any person who has not
previously been convicted of any offense under this chapter or under any statute of the United States
or of any state relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
drugs, pleads guilty or is found guilty of possession of a controlled substance . . . the court, without
entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the accused, may defer further proceedings and
place him on probation upon terms and conditions.”) (emphasis added). But cf. People v. Sheehan,
659 N.E.2d 1339, 1342-45 (Ill. 1995) (finding a prior diversionary sentence of supervision for
driving while intoxicated could be used to enhance subsequent sentence for same offense because
sentencing enhancement statute used term “committed” rather than “convicted”).
3. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 (2007). Although Guideline § 4A1.2
generally speaks in terms of “sentences,” or “prior sentences,” it frequently muddies the issue by
speaking in terms of “convictions” as well. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(3) (convictions with suspended
sentences); § 4A1.2(a)(4) (discussing and defining “convicted of an offense” before sentencing
occurs); § 4A1.2(d)(1) (adult convictions); § 4A1.2(h) (sentences for “foreign convictions”); §
4A1.2(i) (sentences for “tribal court convictions”); § 4A1.2(j) (sentences for “expunged
convictions”). In fact, the one criminal history point the Guidelines award defendants for
diversionary dispositions is the exact same number they award defendants for misdemeanor and
even felony convictions with jail sentences of up to 60 days. Compare U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) (“add 2 points under §4A1.1(b) for each adult or juvenile
sentence to confinement of at least sixty days”) with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4A1.2(d)(2)(B) (“add 1 point under §4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence . . . not covered in
(A)”) (emphasis added). In any event, by counting sentences rather than convictions, Guideline §
4A1.2 blurs the line, apparently deliberately, between convictions and non-convictions, and thereby
treats them identically. At least one state, Utah, does not even impose a sentence, much less a
conviction, upon defendants who receive its “plea in abeyance.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-1
(2007). Moreover, many federal courts refer to and treat diversionary dispositions as “convictions”
even though state law says otherwise. See, e.g., United States v. Lluvias, 168 F. App’x 732, 733734 (7th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (a “conviction for drunk driving is counted”) (emphasis
added); United States v. Paseur, 148 Fed. App’x. 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion)
(repeatedly referring to a Mississippi order of non-adjudication as a “conviction”).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Dell, 359 F.3d 1347, 1348-49 (10th Cir. 2004) (expressly
declining to use Utah’s interpretation of a “plea in abeyance” as a non-conviction and holding it was
a conviction for purposes of the guideline definition of “felony conviction” pursuant to Guideline §
2K2.1(a) & cmt. n.1). In accordance with Guideline § 4A1.2(f), most federal opinions find
diversionary dispositions countable as prior sentences when the defendant is statutorily required or
otherwise does plead guilty or enter a plea of no contest or when the court makes a finding of guilt.
See, e.g., United States v. Charlton, 121 F.3d 700, 700 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion)
(highlighting West Virginia statute that deferred adjudication upon a plea or finding of guilt);
United States v. Cox, 114 F.3d 1189, 1189 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) (explaining that
Michigan law requires guilty plea before defendant is eligible for diversion); United States v. Jiles,
102 F.3d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that Wisconsin statute deems failure to appear in
court as a plea of no contest); United States v. Craft, Nos. 95-5508, 95-5545, 1996 WL 185783, at
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Illinois Unified Code of Corrections5 provides that “discharge and
dismissal upon a successful conclusion of a disposition of supervision
shall be deemed without adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a
conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law
upon conviction of a crime.”6 The plain meaning of this statute is that
the crime should not be treated as a conviction.7 The statute makes no
distinction between diversionary dispositions in which a finding of guilt
was made and those in which no such finding was made. In contrast, the
Guidelines make this distinction.8 Unless the diversionary disposition
contains no “finding of guilt,”9 is expunged,10 or is a diversion from
juvenile court,11 the diversionary disposition will always count as

*2 (6th Cir. April 17, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (finding that defendant signed and filed a petition
for acceptance of plea of guilty that included an express admission of guilt); United States v. Vela,
992 F.2d 1116, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that Oklahoma deferred sentencing statute
required a verdict, plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere before the court could defer
sentencing and place the defendant on probation); United States v. Cox, 934 F.2d 1114, 1124 (10th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that Colorado deferred judgment law required a plea, as opposed to a
deferred prosecution which required no plea); United States v. Giraldo-Lara, 919 F.2d 19, 22-23
(5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that Texas statute required a plea of guilty to be eligible for "deferred
adjudication probation"); United States v. Rockman, 993 F.2d 811, 813-14 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding
a plea of nolo contendere, where court withholds adjudication of guilt, is countable diversionary
disposition). This line of authority stands for the rule that a diversionary disposition will be counted
as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c) if the court merely defers its adjudication and sentencing upon a plea
or finding of guilt. In contrast, a “[d]iversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt
(e.g., deferred prosecution) is not counted.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f)
(2007).
5. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f) (West 2007).
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (2007).
9. Id. (“Diversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt . . . is not counted.”);
see also United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 812 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding a stipulation to facts,
as opposed to guilty plea, leading to supervision under Illinois law not a countable conviction under
Guidelines); United States v. Porter, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (D. Kan. 1999) (treating “diversion
agreement” for driving under influence of alcohol or drugs under Kansas law as a non-countable
“deferred prosecution” rather than as a countable “deferred adjudication”).
10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(j) (2007) (“Sentences for expunged
convictions are not counted, but may be considered under § 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History
Category).”). Yet even many expunged convictions can count as convictions under Federal
Guidelines law. See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 408 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2005)
(counting expunged convictions under Iowa law that do not reverse or vacate diversionary
dispositions due to legal errors or newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, or are not
constitutionally invalid).
11. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (2007) (“diversion from juvenile
court is not counted”). Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.35(6) (West 2007) (considering juvenile
adjudication as non-conviction, and juvenile not deemed to have been found guilty or criminal by
such adjudication), with State v. Presha, 8 P.3d 14, 17 (Kan. App. Ct. 2000) (refusing to defer to
Florida’s treatment of juvenile adjudication as non-conviction).
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criminal history for the purpose of federal sentencing, regardless of what
state law says.12
Illinois is not the only state in which this conflict between the
Guidelines and state diversionary statutes exists. California too does not
consider findings of guilt as convictions for the purpose of sentencing.
Under California’s statute, a plea of guilty “shall not constitute a
conviction for any purpose.”13 Following the Guidelines would directly
conflict with this statute, because under the Guidelines, “a diversionary
disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of
nolo contendere, in a judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence.”14
The Guidelines’ policy behind counting most diversionary
dispositions as if they were criminal convictions is that “defendants who
receive the benefit of a rehabilitative sentence and continue to commit
crimes should not be treated with further leniency.”15 However, it is not
“further leniency” to treat a state diversionary disposition in a way that
state statutes say they should not be treated, thereby ratcheting up a
federal defendant’s sentence. “Further leniency” would be to give a
federal defendant another diversionary disposition for the federal crime.
It is not principled for the Guidelines to undo the original leniency of the
state diversionary disposition by counting it the same way a conviction
would be counted.
In fact, most states seem to follow the Guidelines’ approach of
increasing a sentence in the case of a prior diversionary disposition.16
However, the express language of most, if not all, of these state statutes
is that diversionary dispositions are not supposed to count as convictions
for any purpose.17 And one such purpose would seem to be aggravation
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (2007) (“A diversionary disposition
resulting from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo contendere, in a judicial proceeding
is counted as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered.”) (emphasis
added).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(d) (West 2007).
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (2007).
15. Id. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.9.
16. See, e.g., People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 38 (Cal. 2004) (remarking that diversionary
disposition for domestic violence under Arizona law counted as “strike” under California’s three
strikes law); State v. Macias, 39 P.3d 85, 88 (Kan. App. Ct. 2002) (refusing to defer to Texas
deferred adjudication in using it to aggravate defendant’s sentence under Kansas law); State v.
Hodgden, 25 P.3d 138, 142 (Kan. App. Ct. 2001) (refusing to defer to Alaska’s procedure whereby
defendant's conviction can be set aside and not counted in his criminal history); State v. Presha, 8
P.3d 14, 17 (Kan. App. Ct. 2000) (refusing to defer to Florida’s treatment of juvenile adjudication as
non-conviction); People v. Johnson, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1133 (Ill. 1989) (“Neither the language nor
history of the [supervision] statute precludes later use as aggravation evidence of criminal behavior
relevant to a criminal charge.”).
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(d) (West 2007) (“A defendant's plea of guilty
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of future sentences. A fortiori, when statutory language is clear,
legislative intent is clear, and courts should not override it with
caselaw.18 Using diversionary dispositions to aggravate future sentences
does precisely that by effectively undoing any benefit from the
previously awarded diversionary disposition.
The purpose of diversionary dispositions is to give an offender the
chance to abide by the law during the diversionary period.19 If he
behaves during that period, the record is supposed to be effectively
“wiped clean.”20 If not, then the diversionary disposition turns into a
If an offender commits another offense after he
conviction.21
successfully completes the diversionary disposition, then it is a
legitimate use of the first diversion not to give him another one. But it is
not legitimate to use a successfully completed diversionary disposition
as if it were a conviction to aggravate a subsequent sentence, in violation
of express statutory language.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The Guidelines’ treatment of state diversionary dispositions the
same as convictions is a widespread problem. In United States v.
Lluvias,22 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a sentence wherein the
pursuant to this chapter [relating to drug offenses] shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose
unless a judgment of guilty is entered. . . .”) (emphasis added); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-63.1(f) (West 2007) (stating that Illinois’s diversionary disposition of “supervision shall be deemed
without adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or
disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime”) (emphasis added). One of the purposes of
the California statute is to “prevent otherwise law-abiding citizens who are amenable to
rehabilitation from acquiring a criminal record.” People v. Wright, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 424 (Ct.
App. 2002).
18. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1551 (2007)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday's decision is nothing other than the elevation of judge-supposed
legislative intent over clear statutory text.”); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 347 (1983) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)) (“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language [of the
statute itself] must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”).
19. See, e.g., People v. Martinsen, 238 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (Ct. App. 1987).
20. See, e.g., People v. Mazurette, 14 P.3d 227, 231 (Cal. 2001) (quoting People v. Perez, 80
Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 195 (Ct. App. 1998) (Kremer, J., concurring)); Commonwealth v. Shouse, 183
S.W.3d 204, 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Flynt v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 415, 418 (Ky. 2003);
Hyatt v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 121, 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (holding a pretrial diversion
under Kentucky Revised Statutes § 533.258 effectively wiped slate clean).
21. See, e.g., KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.256(1) (West 2007) (explaining that if defendant
does not successfully complete pretrial diversion, statute contemplates that trial court will enter final
judgment in accordance with defendant's guilty plea).
22. 168 Fed. App’x 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion). For some reason, courts have
seen fit to treat many of these issues in unpublished opinions. This article frequently relies on such
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sentencing court counted a prior supervision as a conviction, in direct
contradiction to express Illinois statutory law.23 In Lluvias, the
defendant entered a guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.24
Prior to this conviction, the defendant received a sentence of
“supervision”25 under Illinois law for drunk driving.26 This nonconviction under Illinois law, which should have awarded him no
criminal history points, counted as one criminal history point27 under the
Guidelines.28 The discrepancy between the Guidelines and state
statutory law raised Mr. Lluvias’s number of criminal history points
from one to two,29 which automatically disqualified him from getting the
benefit of the so-called “safety valve,”30 a two-point reduction31 in the
offense level calculation that also allows defendants to get out from
under the draconian effects of the statutorily mandated minimum
sentences for most federal drug offenses.32 The prospective appeal from
that one criminal history point assessment was deemed so frivolous that

opinions despite their limited precedential value. However, new Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 allows citation of unpublished orders issued on or after January 1, 2007. Despite the
fact that all of the unpublished opinions in this article were issued before that date, the new-found
citeability of this type of opinion should give them a bit more credibility for academic, if not
practitioner, purposes.
23. Id. at 733-734.
24. Id. at 732.
25. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f) (West 2007); see supra note 2 (discussing 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f)).
26. Lluvias, 168 Fed. App’x at 733.
27. Criminal history points are the Guidelines’ way of calculating a federal defendant’s
criminal history for purposes of increasing his sentence. See generally U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2007) (explaining point system for computing criminal history
category). Each criminal history point adds up to determine a defendant’s “criminal history
category.” Id. Criminal history categories range from I on the lowest end (for zero or one criminal
history point) to VI on the highest end (for thirteen or more criminal history points). U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2007). In turn, these criminal history categories
constitute the entire horizontal axis on the Guidelines’ sentencing table. See id. It is the Guidelines’
sentencing table that ultimately determines a defendant’s now-advisory guideline sentencing range.
See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
28. Lluvias, 168 Fed. App’x at 733 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4A1.2(f) & cmt. n.5, 9 (2007)); United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723, 726-28 (7th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Redding, 104 F.3d 96, 98-99 (7th Cir. 1996).
29. See Lluvias, 168 Fed. App’x at 734. This, in turn, raised Mr. Lluvias’s Criminal History
Category from I to II, but that ultimately didn’t have an effect on his sentence, because the statutory
mandatory minimum took his sentence far in excess of what his guideline range would have been
without it. Id.
30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3553(f) (2007).
31. Id. § 2D1.1(b)(9).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2007).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/3

6

Shapiro: Comity of Errors
SHAPIRO_FINAL

2008]

2/4/2008 11:27:44 AM

COMITY OF ERRORS

237

appellate counsel moved to withdraw and filed an “Anders”33 brief on
that issue, among others.34
But the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
noted that a “conviction for drunk driving is counted.”35 The Court’s
holding is counter to express Illinois statutory law, in which a sentence
of supervision is most decidedly not a conviction.36 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit completely ignored and even disrespected Illinois law in finding
that an argument to the contrary would have been frivolous.37
To make matters worse, in United States v. Paseur38 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit not only affirmed the
district court’s assessment of one criminal history point for a Mississippi
diversionary disposition, but added insult to injury by affirming the
assessment of two additional criminal history points because the
defendant committed the federal crime during the two-year period of the
diversionary disposition.39 This had the effect of not only raising the
defendant’s Criminal History Category from I to II, thereby increasing
his advisory guideline sentencing range, but also of becoming a second
reason he was ineligible for the “safety valve.”40 In Paseur, the
Mississippi state court had “entered an order of non-adjudication for two
years” on a charge of possession of burglary tools.41 The Sixth Circuit
33. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (explaining that in order to discharge
appellate duties, counsel must file motion to withdraw, accompanied by brief exploring all possible
appellate arguments together with explanation why each is frivolous).
34. United States v. Lluvias, 168 Fed. App’x 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion).
35. Id. (citing United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723, 726-28 (7th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis
added).
36. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f) (West 2007); see supra note 2 (discussing 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f)). Cf. State v. Hodgden, 25 P.3d 138, 142 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)
(“Kansas, unlike Alaska, does not have a process whereby after a suspended sentence, successful
probation, and discharge by the court, a defendant's conviction can be set aside and not counted in a
defendant's criminal history.”); State v. Presha, 8 P.3d 14, 17 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (“Florida does
not consider a juvenile adjudication as a conviction, nor is the juvenile deemed to have been found
guilty or a criminal by the adjudication.” (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.228(6) (West 2007))). But
cf. People v. Sheehan, 659 N.E.2d 1339, 1342-45 (Ill. 1995) (finding that a prior diversionary
sentence of supervision for driving while intoxicated could be used to enhance subsequent sentence
for same offense because sentencing enhancement statute used term “committed” rather than
“convicted”); People v. Johnson, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1133 (Ill. 1989) (“Neither the language nor
history of the [supervision] statute precludes later use as aggravation evidence of criminal behavior
relevant to a criminal charge.”); State v. Macias, 39 P.3d 85, 88 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to
defer to Texas deferred adjudication in using it to aggravate defendant’s sentence under Kansas
law).
37. Lluvias, 168 Fed. App’x at 734.
38. 148 Fed. App’x 404 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion).
39. Id. at 409.
40. Id. at 406.
41. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
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begged the question by repeatedly referring to this order of nonadjudication as a “conviction,”42 “even though the Mississippi court
ha[d] yet to formally enter a conviction.”43
However, because the defendant pled guilty to possessing burglary
tools, the non-adjudication of guilt did not matter.44 The Mississippi
state diversionary disposition counted as a conviction, or at least a “prior
sentence,”45 under federal sentencing guideline § 4A1.2(f).46 And
because the defendant was still under the two-year non-adjudication
order, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the assessment of an additional two
criminal history points pursuant to guideline § 4A1.1(d).47 Section
4A1.1(d) requires the two-point increase whenever a federal defendant
commits a federal crime “while under any criminal justice sentence.”48
A “criminal justice sentence” under the express terms of § 4A1.1(d)
includes “probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work
release, or escape status.”49 But certain caselaw, upon which the Paseur
court relied, adds “diversionary dispositions” to this seemingly
exhaustive list.50 Application Note 4 to § 4A1.1 supports this caselaw.51
Application Note52 4 to § 4A1.1 further defines a “criminal justice
sentence” to include “a sentence countable under § 4A1.2 (Definitions
and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) having a custodial or
supervisory component, although active supervision is not required for
this item to apply.”53 Since diversionary dispositions count as a sentence

42. Id. at 406, 408.
43. Id. at 409.
44. Id. at 408.
45. See supra note 3 for a discussion of the distinction (or lack thereof) between “prior
sentence” and “conviction.”
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(f) (2007).
47. Id. at § 4A1.1(d).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Paseur, 148 Fed. App’x at 409 (citing United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1164
(10th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Craft, Nos. 95-5508, 95-5545, 1996 WL 185783, at *2 (6th Cir.
Apr. 17, 1996) (unpublished opinion); see also United States v. Velasquez-Meza, 76 Fed. App’x
926, 929 (10th Cir. 2003). United States v. Wolf, No. 96-2235, 1996 WL 647248, at *2-*3 (7th Cir.
Nov. 1, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 app. n.4 (2007).
52. Application notes are commentary that interpret and further define terms used in a
guideline. “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 45 (1993);
see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.7 (2007) (incorporating the Stinson
principle into the Guidelines themselves).
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 app. n.4 (2007).
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under § 4A1.2, Application Note 4 to § 4A1.1 would make them count
for purposes of § 4A1.1(d) as well.54
Several circuits have adopted the approach set forth in Application
Note 4. In United States v. Gorman,55 the Tenth Circuit relied heavily
on Application Note 4 in its reasoning.56 In Gorman, the defendant
argued that the lower court erroneously took past diversionary
dispositions into account when determining his sentence.57 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, based on the fact that the
Application Note included diversionary dispositions in its definition of a
“criminal justice sentence.”58
The Seventh Circuit also followed this approach in United States v.
Wolf.59 The court reasoned that a “criminal justice sentence” for
purposes of calculating criminal history points should include those
sentences with court supervision because of the “language and the intent
of the guidelines” – language and intent articulated in Application Note
4.60
However, Application Note 4 is guideline commentary, and
guideline commentary is not authoritative if it is “inconsistent with, or a
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”61 By its express terms, §
4A1.1(d) includes only “probation, parole, supervised release,
imprisonment, work release, or escape status.”62 It does not say
“including but not limited to.” It only says “including.”63 Moreover, its
list of criminal justice sentences is reasonably exhaustive. It is true that
immediately preceding this list, § 4A1.1(d) says “any” criminal justice
sentence.64 But it appears that the seemingly exhaustive word
“including” (rather than “including but not limited to”) would make the
list of criminal justice sentences finite for purposes of § 4A1.1(d).

54. Wolf, 1996 WL 647248 at *3 (“It would be anomalous to hold that an order of court
supervision is not a sentence while it is in effect (for purposes of § 4A1.1(d)), but it is countable as a
sentence after successful completion and dismissal of charges.”).
55. 312 F.3d 1159.
56. Id. at 1164.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1167.
59. 1996 WL 647248 at *3.
60. Id.
61. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 45 (1993); see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.7 (2007) (incorporating the Stinson principle into the Guidelines
themselves).
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(d) (2007).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.65
Guideline § 4A1.1(d)’s
expression of a finite list of sentences excludes other sentences such as
diversionary dispositions. Therefore, Application Note 4 to § 4A1.1(d)
would at least be inconsistent with, if not a plainly erroneous reading of,
guideline § 4A1.1(d) itself. It would thus be non-authoritative.66
Perhaps the biggest effrontery to state sentencing law came when
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in
United States v. Binford67 that under Illinois law, “supervision is the
functional equivalent of conditional discharge, which we previously
have held to be the functional equivalent of probation.”68 In fact,
probation and conditional discharge are permanent convictions under
Illinois law.69 By express statutory directive, supervision is not.70 The
Binford court did acknowledge, “[t]he only difference between
conditional discharge and supervision is that the charges against a
convicted defendant on supervision may ultimately be dismissed.”71
However, it held “[t]his is of no consequence for purposes of” the
Guidelines.72 The court thus increased Mr. Binford’s sentence for the
peccadillo of illegal transportation of alcohol. 73
The Seventh Circuit has found that “the guidelines ‘do not rely on
state definitions or labels.’”74 As a matter of comity, perhaps they
should. In the view of federal law, a “defendant is no less guilty of the
offense after completing his court supervision than he was when he was
found guilty, whether or not Illinois still considers him a
misdemeanant.”75 If that is true, why is a defendant any less guilty of the
65. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 703 (1991).
66. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38, 45; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.7 (2007).
67. 108 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 727.
69. People v. Cooper, 547 N.E.2d 449, 454 (1989) (“Probation is a sentence imposed for
criminal convictions.”); People v. Tufte, 649 N.E.2d 374, 380 (1995) (“A defendant who has been
sentenced to conditional discharge has already been tried and convicted of the underlying criminal
offense giving rise to the sentence of conditional discharge.”).
70. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f) (West 2007); see supra note 2 (discussing 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3.1(f)).
71. United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1997).
72. Id. at 728 (counting supervision as conviction for purposes of Guideline § 4A1.2(c)(1),
which is supposed to count as a conviction only offenses for which a term of probation — which is
clearly a conviction under Illinois and most other states’ law — is imposed).
73. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 448 F.3d 958, 960-61 (7th Cir. 2006).
74. Jones, 448 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Burke, 148 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir.
1998)); see also United States v. McKoy, 452 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In determining what
constitutes a ‘prior sentence’ under the Sentencing Guidelines, courts must look to federal, not state
law.”); United States v. Morgan, 390 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir. 2004); accord United States v.
Williams, 176 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gray, 177 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 1999).
75. Jones, 448 F.3d at 960 (quoting Burke, 148 F.3d at 840).
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offense he pled guilty to after he gets the offense expunged?76 After all,
expunction does not “unring the bell” of the guilty plea and
supervision.77 It merely erases it from the defendant’s criminal record. 78
In United States v. Jones,79 the Seventh Circuit considered and
rejected the argument that the Guidelines “‘undermine the design and
effect’ of Illinois law,” or “violate principles of federalism or the Ninth
Amendment.”80 It affirmed a sentence that raised Mr. Jones’s Criminal
History Category by two levels, from I to III, because of the four
criminal history points assessed on the basis of four Illinois nonconvictions.81 Other cases have similarly found that dispositions treated
as non-convictions under state law are treated as convictions under
federal law.82
To make matters worse, the Guidelines draw a distinction between
diversionary dispositions that have been expunged from those that have
not been expunged.83 Thus, even if a diversionary disposition is eligible
for expunction, but has not actually been expunged, the disposition will
count as a conviction.
COMITY AND MCNARY
Longstanding principles of comity demand that federal law respect
state statutory treatment of state convictions.84 The leading United

76. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(j) (2007) (“Sentences for expunged
convictions are not counted, but may be considered under § 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History
Category).”).
77. But cf. R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268, 1280-81 (Fla. 2004) (distinguishing between an
expunction and a pardon and explaining that a pardon “does not remove the historical fact that the
conviction occurred; a pardon does not mean that the conviction is gone”).
78. See State v. Dorn, 94 P.3d 709, 712-13 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (Gutierrez, J., dissenting)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
79. 448 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2006).
80. Id. at 961-62.
81. Id. at 959.
82. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, No. 04-1324, 2007 WL 1838055, at *14, *16 (6th Cir.
2007) (affirming, in post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, sentencing court’s use of three
juvenile diversionary dispositions to increase sentence); United States v. Davis, 17 Fed. App’x 652,
653 (9th Cir. 2001) (highlighting that a guilty plea for domestic violence that was later withdrawn
and dismissed in state court counted as conviction for purposes of computing criminal history
category). Accord United States v. McKoy, 452 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2006).
83. See supra note 10 (discussing the distinction).
84. Ironically, these courts only mention of “comity” is in the context of purporting to respect,
rather than disrespect, prior state judgments. United States v. Jiles, 102 F.3d 278, 281 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding, in part, that collaterally attacking municipal default judgments would “offend[ ]
principles of finality and comity”). But cf. United States v. Hines, 802 F. Supp. 559, 574 (D. Mass.
1992) (finding that a failure to object to constitutionality of Massachusetts state conviction by not
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States Supreme Court case on comity as a rationale to prevent federal
meddling in state business is Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc.
v. McNary.85 In McNary, the petitioners were a group of property tax
protesters complaining of unequal treatment at the hands of various state
tax officials.86 In order to avoid the bar of the Tax Injunction Act,87 the
taxpayers sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.88 And in order to
avoid the bar of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity against suits
seeking to recover damages from state coffers,89 they sued the tax
officials in their individual rather than official capacities.90
The Court noted that an award of damages under § 1983 would first
require a “federal-court declaration” that the tax officials acted
unconstitutionally.91 Yet the taxpayers’ suit did not request injunctive or
other equitable relief, so the Court could not and did not strike down the
taxpayers’ suit on the basis of the Tax Injunction Act (at least not
standing alone).92 Rather, the Court struck it down on the basis of
comity, and the principle of comity that was inherent in the Tax
Injunction Act.93
The Court hastened to add that the principle of comity was not
limited to federal interference with state taxation.94 Comity underlay the
principles of “Our Federalism” and equitable restraint of Younger v.
Harris,95 the McNary Court reminded us.96 Younger applied notions of
comity to prevent federal injunctions against pending state criminal
prosecutions.97 But the Younger doctrine quickly expanded during the
appealing it resulted in waiver having “nothing to do with comity, but rather with time-honored
considerations of judicial efficiency”).
85. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
86. Id. at 105-06.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004).
88. McNary, 454 U.S. at 106-107.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
90. McNary, 454 U.S. at 113.
91. Id. at 106-07, 113, 115.
92. Id. at 107.
93. Id. at 110, 116 (“Congress' . . . enactment of § 1341 was motivated in large part by comity
concerns.”) (punctuation omitted).
94. Id. at 111.
95. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
96. McNary, 454 U.S. at 111-12.
97. In a particularly famous riff on the importance of comity in our federal system, the
Younger Court said:
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal
prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’
that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
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1970s and ‘80s to prevent federal injunctions of many state non-criminal
judicial proceedings too.98
The counter-argument is that comity is a principle in which the
federal system respects the sovereignty of the state system qua state
system. It does not apply when the federal system “borrows” an element
from the state system and effectively “federalizes” it. In the context of
the Guidelines, for example, the federal criminal history calculation
would “borrow” a state criminal disposition and then incorporate it into
the federal calculation. In effect, the state criminal disposition would
lose its state quality and take on a federal one. Under that rationale, a
non-conviction for state purposes would legitimately become a
conviction for federal purposes.
But this counter-argument ignores a fundamental precept of comity
law: one sovereign’s respect for another sovereign’s law. If a criminal
disposition does not count as a conviction for state purposes, why should
it count as one federally? This rationale is even more compelling when
one considers the real-life consequences of treating state dispositions in
ways other than the state intended.

left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack
of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federalism,’ and
one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into
existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of ‘Our
Federalism.’ The concept does not mean blind deference to ‘States’ Rights’ any more
than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National
Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept
does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though
it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors
to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early
struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's
history and its future.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45 (quoted in McNary, 454 U.S. at 112).
98. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (nuisance abatement of
obscenity); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977) (civil contempt); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (recovery of fraudulently obtained welfare benefits); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 434-35 (1979) (child custody proceeding); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982) (state administrative proceeding of judicial nature involving
attorney discipline); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 627-28
(1986) (state administrative proceeding of a judicial nature involving civil rights); Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (state court enforcement of judgments). But cf. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364-65 (1989) (holding that Younger
does not require deference to state court review of legislative or executive action); Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1984) (finding that abstention in favor of state
administrative proceedings not required when state judicial proceedings have not yet commenced).
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PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
First, many criminal defense practitioners only practice in state
court and not federally. As such, they are well within their rights to
advise clients that diversionary dispositions do not count as convictions.
For under state law, they indeed do not. Is it reasonable to expect a state
criminal practitioner to foresee (1) that their petty state court client
might eventually be indicted and convicted federally; and (2) that if and
when s/he is, that petty state non-conviction could very well make a
difference in the client’s criminal history category and sentence?
Second, even criminal defense lawyers who practice in both state
and federal court would be hard-pressed not to advise their state court
client to accept a non-conviction under state law on the off-chance their
client would later be charged with and convicted of a relatively rare (by
comparison to the number of state criminal cases) federal crime. It is
simply unrealistic to expect even lawyers who know the potential federal
consequences of a state court diversionary disposition to avoid giving
their state court clients the chance to keep their state “rap sheet” clean.
BOOKER AND NEW-FOUND FEDERAL SENTENCING FLEXIBILITY
The landmark case of United States v. Booker99 has opened the door
to allow federal sentencing courts to rectify this injustice. In Booker, the
United States Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory instead
of mandatory, as they had been before Booker.100 Although federal
sentencing courts must still consider a correctly calculated guideline
range,101 including the defendant’s criminal history score,102 they are no
longer required to sentence based exclusively on that range. They must
now sentence based on a variety of factors contained in the federal
sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). One of those factors is “the
history and characteristics of the defendant.”103 Part of a defendant’s
“history” is his criminal history.104 And usually, most of that criminal
history is state criminal history.
99. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
100. Id. at 246.
101. Id. at 259; see also United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Barrero, 425 F.3d 154, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2005).
103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3553(f) (2007) (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 234 Fed. App’x 77, 79 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished
opinion) (“pursuant to § 3553(a)(1), [a defendant’s] criminal history and characteristics properly are
subject to the district court's consideration when formulating a sentence”); United States v.
Kathman, 490 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that even though criminal history calculation
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As a matter of comity, courts can and should consider the fact that
state law, unlike the Guidelines, treats some of that state criminal history
as non-convictions. They can also consider the fact that most of those
state court defendants were probably counseled by their state court
criminal defense lawyers that their guilty pleas to diversionary
dispositions would not be treated as convictions. Courts can then
ameliorate the unwarranted harshness of a criminal history category
calculated on the basis of a state diversionary disposition by sentencing
lower than the advisory guideline range.
OVERREPRESENTATION OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
Alternatively, federal sentencing courts can work more within the
Guidelines’ structure by discounting state diversionary dispositions on
the grounds that they overrepresent a defendant’s criminal history.105
Overrepresentation of criminal history was a recognized ground for socalled “departure” from the guideline range even before Booker made
the Guidelines advisory.106
Since Booker, a circuit split exists as to whether traditional
guideline departure methodology is now obsolete since the Guidelines
are merely advisory, and courts can deviate from the Guidelines on
many more grounds than the old departure methodology permitted.107
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have both held that “departures are no
longer relevant in a post-Booker regime where district courts enjoy
authority, within the bounds of reason, to impose sentences that fall
inside or outside the now-advisory guidelines.”108 Other circuits have
already took into account lack of prior convictions, “history and characteristics of the defendant”
permitted court to consider fact that defendant had not been in any trouble with law before); United
States v. Ramirez-Perez, No. 06-1640, 2007 WL 1703678, at *5 (6th Cir. June 14, 2007)
(unpublished opinion) (“The district court adequately took into account the history and
characteristics of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant when it noted
defendant's lengthy criminal history.”); United States v. Rios, 224 Fed. App'x 529, 530 (7th Cir.
2007) (“[T]he [sentencing] court considered [defendant’s] personal history and characteristics,
noting that he did not have a lengthy criminal history and had ‘never been incarcerated.’”) (citations
omitted).
105. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3(b) (2007).
106. See id.
107. Compare United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005) (departure
methodology obsolete) and United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2006) with
United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 2006) (departure methodology still applicable
even after Booker); United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 631 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d
Cir. 2005); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005); and United States v.
Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 939 n.5 (10th Cir. 2005).
108. Mohamed, 459 F.3d at 986; see also Johnson, 427 F.3d at 426.
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held otherwise, finding that departures are still a crucial part in
determining sentences and that the district courts are required to consider
them.109 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has held that Guideline
departures continue to be mandatory after Booker because they are
essential to calculating an advisory Guideline sentencing range. 110
But whether cast in terms of departure methodology or not,
overrepresentation of criminal history is an established means of
deviating from the guideline range.111 Since state court non-convictions
do tend to overrepresent criminal history under the Guidelines, federal
sentencing courts can discount state diversionary dispositions on those
grounds too. Additionally, because the Supreme Court, in Rita v. United
States,112 held that federal courts of appeals are permitted to presume
that a federal sentence imposed within the guideline range is reasonable
provided the sentencing court considered the § 3553(a) factors, there

109. Mohamed, 459 F.3d at 986; see also Johnson, 427 F.3d at 426.
110. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Now, because the
Guidelines are no longer mandatory and the district court need only consider them along with its
analysis of the section 3553(a) factors, the decision to deny a Guidelines-based downward departure
is a smaller factor in the sentencing calculus. Furthermore, many of the very factors that used to be
grounds for a departure under the Guidelines are now considered by the district court – with greater
latitude – under section 3553(a). See e.g., United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th
Cir. 2006) (“In contrast to the sentencing scheme before Booker when a sentence outside the
mandatory guideline range was permitted only on very limited grounds, there are now more
sentencing variables.”).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, 240 F. Supp. 2d 872, 879 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (citing
United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 219 (2d Cir. 2001)) (explaining that “the sentencing court
could consider the amount of drugs involved in the prior offenses, defendant's role in those offenses,
the sentences previously imposed, and the amount of time previously served compared to the
sentencing range called for by the guidelines”); United States v. Fletcher, 15 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir.
1994) (affirming departure based in part on type and unrelatedness of prior convictions); United
States v. Brown, 985 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that court could consider nature of
defendant's prior convictions under § 4A1.3); United States v. Santiago, No. 3:02CR162, 2007 WL
1238610, at *3, *5 (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2007) (denying further sentence reduction on Booker remand
after court had already compensated for two “not especially serious” drug convictions by departing
downward two criminal history categories, from VI to IV, one level further than it otherwise would
have); United States v. Wilkes, 130 F. Supp. 2d 222, 239-40 (D. Mass. 2001) (departing to category
I where defendant had only "two convictions for minor drug offenses" yet was placed in category
III); United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32-34 (D. Mass. 1998) (departing where
defendant's priors were minor, mostly motor vehicle and possession charges, and non-violent);
United States v. Anderson, 955 F. Supp. 935, 937 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (departing from category III to II
based on determination that inclusion of drunk driving and misdemeanor battery convictions
resulted in overstatement of seriousness of defendant's criminal history); United States v. Stevenson,
829 F. Supp. 99, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a departure may be warranted where prior
crimes arise from personal drug use); United States v. Hughes, 825 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Minn.
1993) (departing from category II to I where defendant's record consisted of a one-point conviction
for stealing two packs of cigarettes and a seven-year-old, one-point misdemeanor conviction).
112. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
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may be added importance for federal sentencing courts to not
overrepresent criminal history. 113
CONCLUSION
Federal sentencing courts should use their new-found discretion
under United States v. Booker to defer, under principles of comity, to
state law treatment of diversionary dispositions as non-convictions.
They should (1) consider guideline § 4A1.2(f), as they must still do
under Booker; (2) include it in the calculation of an advisory guideline
range; and then (3) reject including it in the ultimate sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) as an ill-advised treatment of state law.
Alternatively, federal sentencing courts should discount state court nonconvictions when calculating federal sentences, either as a departure or
on grounds that such non-convictions overrepresent criminal history.
Regardless of methodology, it is not “further leniency” for federal
sentencing courts to treat state diversionary dispositions as proscribed by
state statutes.

113. Id. at 2465. The Supreme Court further stated “sentencing courts, applying the Guidelines
in individual cases may depart (either pursuant to the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a
non-Guidelines sentence).” Id. at 2464.
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